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 A political budget cycle is a periodic fluctua-
tion in a government’s fiscal policies, which is
induced by the cyclicality of elections. In this
paper, we will review some recent develop-
ments in the theory and evidence of these
cycles, with an emphasis on the international
comparison of these phenomena. 
We can highlight three areas in which
significant progress has been made in recent
years. First, new theoretical explanations
(models) have been proposed where political
budget cycles arise as the result of a moral
hazard problem between the government and
the electorate. Second, more sophisticated
empirical methods, in particular, time series
methods appropriate for dynamic panel data
regressions, have been adopted in cross-
country analyses. Last but not least, the focus
of recent studies has shifted from industria-
lized countries to all (including developing)
countries, and from the existence of political
budget cycles to the magnitude and com-
position (revenue vs. spending) of these
cycles. 
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This paper provides a review of recent developments in the theory and evidence of political
budget cycles. Specifically, we discuss three areas where significant progress has been made.
First, new theoretical explanations (models) have been proposed where political budget
cycles arise as the result of a moral hazard problem between the government and the
electorate. Second, more sophisticated empirical methods, in particular, time series methods
appropriate for dynamic panel data regressions, have been adopted in cross-country
analyses. Last but not least, the focus of recent studies has shifted from industrialized
countries to all (including developing) countries, and from the existence of political budget
cycles to the magnitude and composition (revenue vs. spending) of these cycles.
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us clarify some restrictions on the scope of
this paper. The political budget cycles
literature used to be part of a broader
literature on political business cycles, which
studies the effects of elections (or more
generally, politics) on the real economy, such
as GDP growth rate and unemployment.1
The literature, in general, shifted away from
studying the real effects of elections to
studying the policy makers’ instruments
partly because of the lack of empirical
evidence,2 and partly because the govern-
ment does not directly control real economic
variables. The theory of political business
cycles requires the additional assumption
that the government’s policy instruments,
fiscal or monetary, have an immediate impact
on the real economy, which is still a highly
contested issue. In this paper, we focus on
political budget cycles alone and ignore
whether there are real effects. For similar
reasons, we will not discuss electoral cycles in
monetary policy (interest rate, inflation,
etc.). For the sake of brevity, instead of
providing further arguments, we refer the
reader to Drazen (2000) who wrote in his
review paper titled “The Political Business
Cycles After 25 years”, 
“A principal conclusion is that models
based on manipulating the economy via
monetary policy are unconvincing both
theoretically and empirically, while
explanations based on fiscal policy
conform much better to the data and
form a stronger basis for a convincing
theoretical model of electoral effects on
economic outcomes.”  
In addition, there is also a so-called
“partisan” approach to political business
cycles, which examines the macroeconomic
implications of electoral cycles when
different political parties have different
ideological and economic preferences. For
example, left-wing parties are more willing to
bear the cost of inflation to fight unemploy-
ment than right-wing parties. The partisan
model has been partly successful in
explaining the macroeconomic fluctuations
in OECD countries where a party’s social
and economic orientation can be relatively
easily identified.3 However, this approach is
unlikely to be fruitful for studying electoral
policy cycles in developing countries, where
the differences in economic and ideological
preferences among parties are much harder
to pin down, and the distinction frequently
does not exhibit the typical Western left-
right pattern.  In fact, no study on the
experience of developing countries used a
partisan model. Since our emphasis in this
paper is on the cross-country comparison of
electoral budget cycles, we will focus on the
universal re-election motivation, rather than
partisan difference, of political parties. 
The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 provides a summary of the
moral hazard model of political budget cycles
and its predictions. Section 3 discusses the
specification and the dynamic panel data
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1.  Nordhaus (1975) provides the first formal model of political business cycles resulting from the opportunistic
pre-electoral manipulation of the government.
2.  “[T]here is no significant pre-electoral increase in aggregate economic activity prior to elections in either the
U.S. or the OECD countries,” Drazen (2000).
3.  The partisan approach to political business cycles started with Hibbs (1977). Alesina (1987) incorporates par-
tisan preferences into a rational expectation model. Interested readers are referred to Alesina et al. (1997) for a
comprehensive presentation of both the theoretical results and the empirical tests using U.S. and OECD 
data.
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in the recent empirical literature. In Section
4, we review the empirical findings of
political budget cycles from an international
perspective. Finally, Section 5 outlines direc-
tions for future research.  
The moral hazard approach to
political budget cycles
Before we describe the recent, moral hazard-
based models of political budget cycles, let us
briefly mention their (adverse selection–
type) predecessors. The first such model of
political budget cycles is due to Rogoff and
Sibert (1988). They assume that each
political candidate has a competence level
(high or low), which is only known to the
politician and not to the electorate.
Nevertheless, voters want to elect the more
competent politician (either the incumbent
or the challenger). They form rational
expectations regarding the type of the
incumbent based on observable current fiscal
policy outcomes. Before the election, the
high-type incumbent will attempt to signal
his type (and thereby increase his chances of
reelection) by engaging in expansionary fiscal
policy, which is less “costly” for him than it is
for the low type. This leads to a pre-election
increase in government deficit when a
competent politician is in office (while no
signaling takes place when the incumbent’s
type is low). In a related model, Rogoff
(1990) argues that the incumbent can also
signal his competence before an election by
shifting government expenditure towards
easily observed consumption spending and
away from investment (whose effect can only
be observed with a delay).4 In all these
models, signaling is the driving force behind
the electoral budget cycle, which results from
the temporary asymmetry of information
regarding the politicians’ competence level. 
These models of electoral budget cycles
sparked a new wave of interest in political
economy in the 1990s and are attractive for a
number of reasons. First of all, they assume
rationality and strategic behavior on the part
of politicians and the electorate. They focus
on the policy instruments (i.e., the
manipulation of fiscal policies) that are
directly controlled by the government,
instead of the effects on the real economy.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, their
main prediction (that incumbent govern-
ments manipulate fiscal policies prior to
elections) is generally supported by empirical
tests. However, some of the implications of
the signaling models seem to be at odds with
both empirical and anecdotal evidence. For
example, it is the more competent politician
(rather than the less competent one) who
distorts the economy in the separating
equilibrium of the signaling game, and only
competent politicians will be reelected. In
addition, since only competent types signal
by creating a boom before an election, the
testable implications are unclear without
additional information on the (unobserv-
able) type of the incumbent. 
Recently, a new type of models of
electoral budget cycles – based on moral
hazard rather than adverse selection – has
been proposed by Persson and Tabellini
(2000) and Shi and Svensson (2002a).5 We
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4.  Persson and Tabellini (1990) proposed a similar model with asymmetric information as the driving force of electoral
policy cycles. In their model, the government uses monetary policy to affect the real economy via the Phillips curve.
5.  Lohmann (1998) was the first to use a moral hazard approach in the political business cycle literature. How-
ever, she studied pre-electoral monetary expansions and their inflationary consequences in a neo-Keynesian
macro-model.
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of models (all based on Holmstrom’s [1982]
moral hazard model of career concern), and
then discuss the empirical predictions. 
According to the moral hazard approach
(and exactly as in adverse selection models),
each politician has a type (competence level)
measuring, for example, their ability to
produce public goods without raising taxes
(their “productivity”).6 However, in contrast
to the adverse selection approach, it is
assumed that neither the electorate nor the
politician can observe the politician’s compe-
tence contemporaneously. Given the large set
of possible policy issues that a government
may face, the assumption simply means that
politicians are (ex ante) uncertain about how
well they will be able to handle future
problems, and thus how well they will be
able to transform government revenues into
public output. 
Voters are rational, and want to elect the
more competent politician (between the
incumbent and the challenger), since that
would imply higher post-election public
goods production. Their inference is based
on the observable macroeconomic perfor-
mance of the incumbent government, such
as the amount of public goods produced, the
level of unemployment, etc. The key
assumption is that the incumbent govern-
ment can exert a hidden effort, that is, to use
a policy instrument unobservable to the
public (or only observable with a delay),
which is a substitute for competence. For
example, if competence measures how well
the politician can convert revenues into
public goods, then the hidden effort can be
interpreted as the government’s short-term
excess borrowing. This seems like a reason-
able assumption since the government can,
through clever accounting techniques,
obstruct voters’ ability to assess its borrowing
needs. A larger hidden effort (more secret
borrowing) will not be concurrently observ-
able to the public. 
Elections take place after the incumbent
government’s hidden effort and competence
jointly determine the observable macro
variables (the level of public goods, for
example). Clearly, the incumbent govern-
ment would like to increase its performance
index by exerting more effort (borrow more),
hoping that voters would attribute the boost
in public goods provision to its competence.
In equilibrium, however, the electorate
cannot be fooled: they are also aware of the
incumbent’s intentions, and hence they can
correctly infer competence from the inflated
performance indicators. Nevertheless, in the
equilibrium of this moral hazard game, we
should expect excessive effort on the part of
the incumbent politician, and (ex post) we
should observe excessive borrowing and an
increase in the budget deficit before election.
Note that here, in contrast to adverse
selection models, all types of the incumbent
government will incur excessive pre-election
budget deficits (independent of their
competence level). 
The testable predictions of the moral
hazard model are that policy outcomes,
particularly the government’s budget
balance, are influenced by the timing of
elections. Prior to elections the incumbent
engages in pre-electoral policy manipulations
to increase his chance of reelection. As a
result, a deficit is created. Since all types of
the incumbent have the same incentive
structure in the moral hazard model, one can
70 Min Shi and Jakob Svensson
6.  Competence could also stand for the politician’s ability to deal with exogenous shocks, or other characteristics
that voters care about. However, we stay with the first interpretation for the sake of the clarity of the exposition.
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the type of the incumbent government is not
observable. 
The dynamic panel-data estimation
technique
The most common empirical test of the
electoral budget cycles on a panel of
countries has the following form (for all i = 1,
…N indexing countries, and t = 1, …T
indexing time), 
k
yi,t = Σ γjyi,t–j + χ′wi,t + βeei,t + ξi + εi,t .       (1)
j=1
In this equation, yi,t is the policy outcome,
wi,t a vector of economic variables that may
affect yi,t , ei,t an election dummy variable, ξi
an unobserved country-specific effect, and
εi,t an i.i.d. error term. Equation (1) is a
standard dynamic panel data specification
because the lagged dependent variables, yi,t–j
for j = 1, 2, ..k, are among the explanatory
variables. It is widely known that when the
unobserved country-specific effects are
different across countries, the simple
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator is
biased. Therefore, in order to allow for cross-
country differences in the time-average of the
dependent variable, most empirical studies in
the 1990s have employed Fixed-Effects
estimators. For example, one can eliminate
the country-specific effect by taking a
within-transformation of the above regres-
sion equation, 
k
∆yi,t = Σ γj∆yi,t–j + χ′∆wi,t +
j=1
βe∆ei,t + ∆εi,t ,                                  (2)
where ∆yi,t = yi,t – yi,t–1, and then apply the
OLS estimations to this differenced regres-
sion equation. 
However, the inclusion of lagged
dependent variables in equation (1) poses
another source of bias with the OLS
estimation that cannot be eliminated by a
Fixed-Effects regression. For the OLS
estimator to be unbiased, each explanatory
variable (as a column vector of observations)
has to be uncorrelated with the vector of
error terms. But in equation (1), this
assumption is violated as the vector of a j-
lagged dependent variable, 
→ yi,–j , is correlated
with the vector  
→ εi. For example, for a given
country i, the t th element of the vector 
→ yi,–1,
namely  yi,t–1, and the (t – 1)th element of 
the vector   
→ εi, namely εi,t–1, are related in
equation (1). Similarly, it is easy to see that
the Fixed-Effects regression exhibits the same
problem: the t th  element of the vector ∆
→ yi,–1,
namely (yi,t–1 – yi,t–2), is correlated with the t th
element of the vector ∆
→ εi), which is (εi,t –
εi,t–1). The bias of the Fixed Effects (FE)
estimator, which is present in all variables,
diminishes only as T → ∝, therefore the FE
estimator is biased (but consistent).7
To avoid these problems, Arellano and
Bond (1991) developed a Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator for
dynamic panel data regressions. The key idea
is to find an instrumental variable for
equation (2), which is correlated with ∆yi,t–j ,
but not with ∆εi,t. Arellano and Bond (1991)
note that under the assumption that the error
term ∆εi,t  is not serially correlated, values of
y lagged  two or more periods satisfy these
criteria and could be used as instruments for
∆yi,t–1. More specifically, the moment
condition is as follows: 
Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments 71
7.  See Nickell (1981) and Kiviet (1995) for the proof of this claim.
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Although these GMM estimators (based on
the first differencing equation) should yield
consistent estimates, Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show
that these estimators have poor precision in
finite samples in simulation studies. The
intuition for this is simply that when the
explanatory variables are persistent over time,
lagged levels of these variables are only
weakly correlated with the differences of
these variables in the differenced regression
equation. In order to increase the precision of
the estimates, they propose to combine the
above differenced regression with the original
regression in levels. The instruments for the
regression in differences are those described
above, while the instruments for the
regression in levels are the lagged differences
of the dependent variables. Formally, the
additional moment condition is the
following:
E [∆yi,t–s(ξi + εi,t )] = 0      for s ≥ 1            (4)
Combining the moment conditions for the
difference and level equations yields the
system GMM estimator.8 Note that the
consistency of the system GMM estimator
depends on the validity of the instruments,
which can be tested by Sargan-test. 
Since the system GMM estimator
controls for unobserved country-specific
effects as well as potential endogeneity of the
explanatory variables, it is a preferred
method to the Fixed-Effects estimators. The
disadvantage of it, however, is that it reduces
the sample sizes due to the reliance on 
the  “internal instruments”; i.e., lagged
explanatory variables. In addition, its small-
sample properties are generally unknown. 
Though the system GMM estimation
technique is still relatively new, it has already
been applied in the empirical studies of
electoral budget cycles. In the next section,
we will report some results obtained using
this estimation method, and compare it with
the results from Fixed-Effects regressions. 
Empirical findings
Early empirical studies on political budget
cycles focused on the experience of the
United States. For example, Tufte (1978)
documents a number of clear incidents of
pre-electoral opportunistic manipulation in
fiscal instruments, such as, government
transfers. Alesina (1988) performs an OLS
regression on a one-country version of
equation (1) and finds a significant election
year increase in net transfer over GNP for the
U.S. over the period of 1961–1985. 
Alesina et al. (1992, 1997) extend the
analysis to other industrialized countries.
They perform cross-section time series
regressions using a specification similar to
equation (1) on a panel of 13 OECD
countries for the period between 1961 and
1993. Their Fixed-Effects estimates imply
that, after controlling for other determinants
of fiscal balances, government budget deficit
is higher by 0.6 percent of GDP in election
years. 
Although the literature on political
budget cycles originated in the context 
of competitive elections of industrialized
countries, recently, a growing literature
72 Min Shi and Jakob Svensson
8.  Similarly concerns arise for the control variables, wit. One can assume it to be weakly exogenous (or predeter-
mined) and use the following moment conditions: E[wi,t–s∆εi,t] = 0, for s ≥ 2, t ....T,   in differenced regressions
and  E[∆wi,t–s,(ξi+εi,t)] = 0, for s  ≥ 1 in level regressions. Election terms are usually assumed to be 
exogenous. 
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countries. In the last three decades, many
developing countries have adopted
democratic political reforms; a natural
question to ask is whether this process
brought about side effects such as election-
induced policy cycles.9 Most studies of
individual developing countries report OLS
estimators and have, in general, found
evidence of political budget cycles. For
example, Krueger and Turan (1993) show
that pre-electoral fiscal manipulation was
common in Turkey in the period of
1950–1980. While Remmer (1993) finds
mixed results for eight Latin American
economies, Gonzalez (2002a) confirms the
existence of an electoral cycle in government
spending in Mexico over the period of
1958–1997.10
Interestingly, cross-country studies, using
data from developing countries, not only
confirm the existence of politically-driven
budget cycles, but also show that the
magnitude of these cycles is quite large. For
example, Ames (1987) studies 17 Latin
American countries and finds that, on
average, government expenditure increases
by 6.3% in the pre-election year and decrease
by 7.6% in the year after the election.
Similarly, Kraemer (1997) and Rojas-Suárez
et al. (1998) both show evidence that Latin
American governments are more inclined to
adopt expansionary fiscal policies during
electoral periods, which results in a
significant deterioration of fiscal stance.
Schuknecht (1996) confirms the election-
induced fiscal policy cycles for a panel of 35
developing countries; his regression results
show that the overall fiscal balance worsens
by more than 0.6 percent of GDP in election
years. In addition, Schuknecht (2000)
investigates which fiscal variable is most
affected by the timing of elections, using a
sample of 24 countries for the 1973–92
period. He finds that public investment
cycles are particularly prominent. All these
cross-country studies use Fixed-Effects
estimators. Block (2002a) is the first paper
that uses GMM regressions in estimating the
electoral effects on government policies, for a
cross-section of 44 Sub-Saharan African
countries. His point estimate suggests that
the government fiscal deficit increases by 1.2
percentage point in election years in the
sample. In addition, Block (2002b), using a
sample of 69 countries, provides evidence
that government expenditures shift towards
more visible current consumption and away
from public investment in competitive (e.g.,
multi-party) elections. 
The above results suggest that electoral
budget cycles are not confined to
industrialized countries, rather, they appear
to be a general pattern in countries where
elections are held. Unfortunately, this claim
is not investigated to the fullest extent in the
studies cited above. In particular, none of the
data sets contain all, or a representative
sample of, countries with elections. More-
over, the empirical methods vary across
studies. 
A recent paper by Shi and Svensson
(2002a) addresses these issues. Their data set
includes all countries – both developed and
Political Budget Cycles: A Review of Recent Developments 73
9.  Although it should be noted these budget cycles may perform an efficiency enhancing role, by signalling com-
petence and thereby increase the likelihood that competent politicians get re-elected (see Rogoff (1990)).
10. Several studies focus on the effects of local elections. For example, Khemani (1999) examines the experience of
14 major states of Indian from 1960 to 1994, and finds that election years have a negative effect on some com-
modity taxes and a positive effect on public investment, though there is no change in local fiscal balances. Pet-
terson Lidbom (2001) shows that, in Sweden, local government spending is 1.5 percentage point higher and
taxes are 0.4 percentage point lower in election years.
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period of 1975 to 1995. The data allow them
to study whether electoral effects on fiscal
policy variables are common across
countries, and whether there are differences
in the size and composition of political
budget cycles between developed and
developing countries. Shi and Svensson
(2002a) use GMM technique and find that
on average, fiscal deficit increases by 1
percentage point of GDP in election years.
Moreover, the magnitude of political budget
cycles is much greater in developing
countries than in developed countries.
Regarding the source of electoral budget
cycles, they show that political budget cycles
are driven both by reduction in taxes and
increase in government spending, and the
two effects are of similar magnitude. 
To summarize, the literature has extended
the analysis to include developing countries
in searching for the evidence of political
budget cycles. This turned out to be a fruitful
attempt. The evidence suggests that political
budget cycles appear to be a general pattern
in all countries with elections and that the
size of election-induced budget cycles are
greater in developing countries. In the next
subsection, we discuss what may explain this
difference. 
Conditional cycle
Three recent papers offer some insight on
why the magnitude of political budget cycles
is different across countries. Gonzalez
(2002b) incorporates the cost of removing a
policymaker from office (the “degree of
democracy”) and the probability that voters
learn the incumbent’s competence costlessly
(“transparency”) in a Rogoff (1990) type
signaling model of political budget cycles.
Her model predicts that electoral budget
cycles emerge only when it is not very costly
to remove a politician from office, and that
the size of political budget cycles decrease as
the degree of transparency increases. More-
over, she shows that, when there is a positive
correlation between the degree of democracy
and transparency, political budget cycles arise
only at intermediate levels of democracy. 
Shi and Svensson (2002a) also introduce
two variables to their moral hazard model of
political budget cycles to capture the effect of
the institutional environment on the size of
electoral budget cycles: the politician’s rents
of being in office, and the share of informed
voters (the percentage of the electorate that
can observe the hidden action). They show
that the more private benefits politicians gain
while in power, the stronger their incentives
to influence the voters’ perceptions prior to
the election to enhance the chances of re-
election, therefore, the larger the size of the
political budget cycles. Similarly, the lower
the share of informed voters, the more voters
fail to distinguish pre-electoral manipula-
tions from incumbent competence, and the
higher the return from boosting spending
prior to the election. 
To test these predictions, Gonzalez
(2002b) studies the relation between the
level of democracy and the magnitude of the
political budget cycle in a sample of 43
countries over the period 1950–97. She
estimates a vector autoregression system and
shows that the political budget cycles are
largest in countries with intermediate levels
of democracy. Shi and Svensson (2002b)
show that the size of political budget cycles
are positively correlated with the politicians’
rents and negatively associated with the share
of informed voters, as predicted by their
model. Importantly, the results continue to
hold after controlling for a broad range of
other possible explanatory variables,
including income levels and an index of
political rights. 
Persson and Tabellini (2002) presents
74 Min Shi and Jakob Svensson
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affected by electoral rules (majoritarian vs.
proportional) and the form of government
(presidential vs. parliamentary), based on a
data set that includes 60 democratic
economies for the period of 1960 to 1998.
Their Fixed-Effects estimates suggest that
countries with majoritarian elections cut
fiscal spending during elections while
countries with proportional elections raise
welfare spending. While they confirm pre-
election tax cuts is a common phenomenon
with both types of government, they find
that post-election spending cuts and tax
increases only occur under presidential
governments. 
Directions for future research
In this paper, we provided a brief review on
the current status of both theoretical and
empirical literature on political budget
cycles. On the theory front, we discuss the
new moral hazard-based approach where
political budget cycles arise in equilibrium in
all elections, independent of the incumbent
party’s competence level. On the empirical
front, we review the empirical studies based
on various samples, including developing
countries, in different time periods. In
general, these studies confirm the prediction
of the moral hazard model. Moreover, it is
shown that the sizes of political budget cycles
vary dramatically across countries. 
An important area for future research
concerns how the size and especially the
composition (taxes vs. spending) of the
electoral policy cycle depend on political and
institutional features of the country. Shi and
Svensson (2002a), Persson and Tabellini
(2002), and Gonzalez (2002b), provided
some evidence of what type of political and
institutional features matter, but more work
along these lines is likely to be fruitful. 
Another important question is how the
endogeneity of the timing of elections might
affect political budget cycles. In most of the
empirical work we discussed above, the
election schedule is assumed to be fixed or
exogenous to fiscal policies. However, since
both the timing of elections and the fiscal
policies could be affected by a common set of
(unobserved) variables that are not included
in the standard regressions, we do not know
if the positive association between the
incidence of elections and the greater
election-year fiscal deficit constitutes a causal
relation. Shi and Svensson (2002b) provide
the first effort to deal with this issue in a large
cross section of countries. They analyze each
election in a sample that contain 91
developed and developing countries for a
span of 21 years and identify whether or not
the election timing is predetermined. This
enables them to distinguish between
outcomes due to deliberate policy choices
and unobserved events that are confounded
with both the timing of elections and fiscal
policies. Focusing on predetermined
elections, they not only confirm that political
budget cycles exist in the sample, but provide
evidence that the difference in political
budget cycles between developing and
developed countries is magnified. 
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